'    ■',..    .    •    ■:'     ■■■-.■■  ■  ■■■'..       .;■   ■  ■    ■        '■'-      '  '■■..-.■.   ■■■.    •    /  '■:    '     ■,.    •■■■         '  ■        ...■■"■    ...■     .< 


TW£9 


Military  Order  of  the  Loyal  Legion 
of  the  United  States 

ommandery  of  the  District  of  Columbia 


WAR  IVAPF.R 


A   Glimpe<  li^nnan  Fifty   Years  Ago." 


i  Qeral 

Will    \  \\/\\l>T  WOODHUIX 
I 


READ  AT  THE  STATED  Ml -i         *     OF  DEC.  2,  1914. 


STEPHEN  Bo  WEEKS 

CUSS  OF  1886;  PHD.  THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY 


OF   THE 

IMWKSfflY  OF  MM1 CAR0DNA 
TIE  WEEKS  €MMVMM 

OF 


OS 


& 


Cp3io.' .'      &s 


Military  Order  of  the  Loyal  Legion 
of  the  United  States 

Commandery  of  the  District  of  Columbia 


WAR  PAPER 

A  Glimpse  of  Sherman  Fifty  Years  Ago.1 


By 

COMPANION 

Brevet  Brigadier-General 

MAXWELL  VANZANDT  WOODHULL 

U.  S.  Volunteers. 


No.   97 


READ  AT  THE  STATED  MEETING  OF  DEC.  2,  1914. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2013 


http://archive.org/details/aglimpseofshermaOOwood 


A  GLIMPSE  OF  SHERMAN  FIFTY  YEARS  AGO 

At  the  time  of  which  I  am  writing — December  13th-15th, 
1864 — I  was  aide-de-camp  to  Major  General  Oliver  O.  How- 
ard who  commanded  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  the  right 
wing  of  General  Sherman's  army,  and  also,  I  was  serving  as 
Assistant  Adjutant  General  with  the  artillery  of  the  army. 

December  13th,  1864,  I  was  ordered  by  General  Howard 
to  accompany  General  Hazen,  who  commanded  the  Second 
Division  of  the  15th  Army  Corps,  in  his  advance  upon  Fort 
McAllister  on  the  lower  Ogeechee  River,  Hazen  having 
recently  rebuilt  the  bridge  across  the  Ogeechee  at  Kings  Mills. 

The  advance  of  the  troops  reached  the  neighborhood  of 
Fort  McAllister  about  2  p.  m.  and  General  Hazen  at  once 
began  his  dispositions  for  an  assault  upon  the  fort. 

He  established  a  strong  skirmish  line  which  was  pushed 
as  close  to  the  fort  as  possible,  the  men  taking  advantage  of 
the  configuration  of  the  ground,  of  the  trees,  and  the  stumps 
and  logs  which  covered  the  ground  in  front  of  the  fort,  to 
protect  themselves  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 

As  his  brigades  came  up,  General  Hazen  put  them  in  posi- 
tion for  the  attack,  the  movement  of  the  troops  being  shielded 
from  the  observation  of  the  enemy  by  a  "dark  fringe  of 
woods  that  encompassed  the  fort." 

General  Sherman  thus  describes  Fort  McAllister  in  his 
Memoirs : 

"The  fort  was  an  inclosed  work,  and  its  land  front  was  in 
the  nature  of  a  bastion  and  curtains,  with  good  parapet, 
ditch,  fraise  and  chevaux  de  fraise  made  out  of  the  large 
branches  of  live  oaks.  Luckily,  the  rebels  had  left  the  larger 
and  unwieldy  trunks  on  the  ground,  which  served  as  a  good 


cover  for  the  skirmish  line,  which  crept  behind  these  logs,  and 
from  them  kept  the  artillerist  from  loading  and  firing  their 
guns  accurately." 

General  Hazen's  plan  of  attack  was  by  brigades  in  line  of 
battle,  the  front  of  each  brigade  being  determined  by  the 
apparent  extent  of  the  face  of  the  fort  immediately  in  its 
front  and  upon  which  it  was  to  direct  its  attack,  each  brigade 
maintaining  its  own  reserves. 

It  was  slow  work  getting  the  troops  in  position  for  the 
assault  because  it  was  desirable  that  the  battle  line  should  be 
approached  as  near  as  possible  to  the  fort  without  attracting 
the  observation  of  the  enemy,  so  as  to  shorten  the  distance 
over  which  the  men  would  have  to  advance  when  the  assault 
should  be  ordered. 

During  these  movements  of  the  troops  General  Hazen  made 
no  use  of  his  guns,  and  I  ventured  to  ask  him  if  he  did  not 
intend  to  precede  the  assault  by  the  fire  of  his  artillery. 

He  replied,  "No,  I  do  not  believe  in  advertising  an  assault 
by  artillery  fire." 

I  have  frequently  thought  of  this  reply,  and  with,  of 
course,  the  qualification  of  location  and  position,  of  its  good 
judgment.  Often  artillery  fire  antecedent  to  an  advance  of 
infantry  to  the  attack  not  only  advertises  such  attack,  but 
results  in  a  waste  of  ammunition  which  later  in  the  action 
could  be  used  to  much  better  advantage. 

The  assault  was  delivered  about  5  o'clock  p.  m. 

During  the  afternoon  of  December  13th  General  Sherman 
and  General  Howard  were  at  Cheeves  Mill  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Ogeechee  River,  about  three  miles  above  Fort  McAllister, 
and  in  plain  view  of  the  fort  and  of  the  assault  which  they 
observed  with  their  field  glasses,  and  which  General  Sherman 
describes  as  follows : 


"The  sun  was  rapidly  declining,  and  I  was  dreadfully  im- 
patient. *  *  *  When  the  sun  was  about  an  hour  high,  another 
signal-message  came  from  General  Hazen  that  he  was  all 
ready,  and  I  replied  to  go  ahead.  *  *  * 

"Almost  at  that  instant  of  time,  we  saw  Hazen's  troops 
come  out  of  the  dark  fringe  of  woods  that  encompassed  the 
fort,  the  lines  dressed  as  on  parade,  with  colors  flying,  and 
moving  forward  with  a  quick,  steady  pace.  Fort  McAllister 
was  then  all  alive,  its  big  guns  belching  forth  dense  clouds 
of  smoke,  which  soon  enveloped  our  assaulting  lines.  One 
color  went  down,  but  was  up  in  a  moment.  As  the  lines 
advanced,  faintly  seen  in  the  white,  sulphurous  smoke,  there 
was  a  pause,  a  cessation  of  fire;  smoke  cleared  away,  and 
the  parapets  were  blue  with  our  men,  who  fired  their  muskets 
in  the  air,  and  shouted  so  that  we  actually  heard  them,  or  felt 
that  we  did." 

"Fort  McAllister  was  taken,  and  the  good  news  was  in- 
stantly sent  by  the  signal  officer  (at  Cheeves  Mill)  to  our  navy 
friends  on  the  approaching  gunboat,  for  a  point  of  timber 
had  shut  out  Fort  McAllister  from  their  view,  and  they  had 
not  seen  the  action  at  all,  but  must  have  heard  the  cannon- 
ading." 

"The  assault  had  been  made  by  three  parties  in  line,  one 
from  below,  one  from  above  the  fort,  and  the  third  directly 
in  rear,  along  the  capital.  All  were  simultaneous  and  had  to 
pass  a  good  abattis  and  line  of  torpedoes,  which  actually  killed 
more  of  the  assailants  than  the  heavy  guns  of  the  fort,  which 
generally  overshot  the  mark.  Hazen's  entire  loss  was  reported 
killed  and  wounded,  ninety-two.  Each  party  reached  the 
parapet  about  the  same  time,  and  the  garrison  inside,  of  about 
two  hundred  and  fifty  men  (about  fifty  of  them  killed  or 
wounded),  were  in  his  power." 


6 

General  Hazen's  division  was  one  of  the  veteran  divisions 
of  the  army,  and  had  been  commanded  by  General  Sherman 
at  Shiloh  and  Vicksburg. 

After  the  fort  was  taken,  Generals  Sherman  and  Howard 
came  down  the  river  to  General  Hazen's  headquarters,  and 
later  in  the  evening  they  both  dropped  down  the  river  to  the 
U.  S.  man-of-war  lying  in  the  stream  below  Fort  McAllister, 
thus  opening  communication  with  the  fleet. 

That  night,  under  date  of  the  "U.  S.  S.  Dandelion,  Ossabaw 
Sound,  December  13,  1864,  11 :50  p.  m.,"  General  Sherman 
reported  to  the  Secretary  of  War  the  arrival  of  his  army  in 
front  of  Savannah. 

He  proceeded  by  water  to  Wassaw  Sound,  where  he  met 
Admiral  Dahlgren,  with  whom  and  General  Foster,  he  ar- 
ranged for  resupplying  his  army,  General  Foster  agreeing  to 
send  him  at  once,  at  Cheeves  Mill  or  King  Bridge  above  Fort 
McAllister,  six  hundred  thousand  rations  for  the  troops,  and 
all  the  rifled  guns  of  heavy  caliber  with  ammunition  which  he 
had  on  hand,  with  which  to  bombard  Savannah  from  positions 
already  held  by  the  army. 

General  Sherman  says  in  his  Memoirs,  "Admiral  Dahlgren 
then  returned  with  me  in  the  Harvest  Moon  to  Fort  Mc- 
Allister. This  consumed  all  of  the  14th  of  December;  and 
by  the  loth  I  had  again  reached  Cheeves  Mill,  where  my  horse 
awaited  me,  and  I  rode  on  to  General  Howard's  headquarters 
at  Anderson's  plantation,  on  the  plank  road,  about  eight  miles 
back  of  Savannah.  I  reached  this  place  about  noon,  and 
immediately  sent  orders  to  my  own  headquarters  on  the 
Louisville  Road,  to  have  them  brought  over  to  the  plank  road, 
as  a  place  more  central  and  convenient ;  gave  written  notice  to 
Generals  Slocum  and  Howard  of  all  the  steps  taken,  and 
ordered  them  to  get  ready  to  receive  siege  guns,  and  put  them 


in  position  to  bombard  Savannah,  and  to  prepare  for  the 
general  assault."  *  *  * 

"Heavy  details  of  men  were  at  once  put  to  work  to  prepare 
a  wharf  and  depot  at  Kings  Bridge,  and  the  roads  leading 
thereto  were  corduroyed  in  advance." 

When  General  Sherman  reached  the  headquarters  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  on  December  15th,  he  asked  for  Gen- 
eral Howard,  and  on  learning  that  he  was  not  at  headquarters, 
but  was  with  General  Blair,  and  that  he  was  not  expected  to 
return  to  his  headquarters  until  the  next  day,  General  Sherman 
decided  to  spend  the  night  at  our  headquarters,  taking  General 
Howard's  tent. 

There  were  but  two  tents  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  one  reserved  for  General  Howard,  and  one 
the  office  tent  of  the  Adjutant  General.  The  officers  of  the 
staff  were  under  "flies." 

The  tent  of  the  General  was  in  the  center  of  the  line  of 
canvas,  the  flies  being  on  either  hand,  the  tent  of  the  Adjutant 
General  on  one  flank  of  the  line. 

The  weather  was  delightful  but  cool,  and  after  supper  on 
the  evening  of  December  15,  1864,  the  long  line  of  camp-fires 
burned  brightly,  and  the  officers  of  the  staff  sat  in  front  of 
them,  chatting,  until  quite  late  in  the  evening,  when  one  by 
one  they  dropped  off  to  bed,  General  Sherman  having  early 
retired  as  he  was  wearied  by  the  exertions  of  the  past  forty- 
eight  hours. 

Finally  I  found  myself  sitting  alone  at  the  camp-fire,  think- 
ing of  various  things,  and  of  nothing  in  particular,  but  not 
sleepy  enough  to  seek  my  cot,  when  I  heard  the  approach  of 
horses,  and  looking  up  saw  two  riders,  one  evidently  an  officer 
and  the  other  his  orderly. 

The  officer  dismounted,  and  approaching  me,  said: 


8 

"I  am  Colonel  Babcock,  of  General  Grant's  staff,  and  I 
have  just  arrived  with  dispatches  for  General  Sherman.  Is 
the  General  here?" 

On  learning  of  the  General's  presence,  he  said : 

"Please  inform  him  of  my  arrival." 

I  raised  the  flap  of  the  tent,  and  going  in  awakened  General 
Sherman  with  the  information  that  Colonel  Babcock  had  just 
arrived  with  dispatches  from  General  Grant. 

He  exclaimed,  "Get  me  a  light.    Show  Babcock  in." 

I  lighted  a  candle,  and  motioning  to  Colonel  Babcock  to 
enter  the  tent,  resumed  my  seat  before  the  camp-fire,  with 
something  fresh  to  think  of. 

How  long  I  sat  ruminating  I  cannot  say,  some  time  of 
course,  because  General  Sherman  had  not  only  to  read  his 
dispatches  but  to  learn  from  Babcock  the  situation  of  military 
affairs  in  Virginia,  and  in  the  great  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  which  was  in  his  command. 

Presently  I  saw  the  flap  of  the  tent  pushed  aside,  and 
General  Sherman  come  out  into  the  light  of  the  camp-fire. 

He  was  deep  in  thought,  and  utterly  oblivious  to  his  sur- 
roundings. 

He  had  arisen  from  bed  hurriedly  on  my  announcing  the 
arrival  of  Colonel  Babcock,  and  had  slipped  on  his  coat. 

In  no  other  particular  had  he  changed  his  dress. 

He  now  stood  before  me  without  a  hat,  with  his  military 
coat  buttoned  loosely  across  his  breast,  in  gray  drawers  and 
gray  stockings  without  his  boots. 

He  was  utterly  unconscious  of  physical  comfort  or  dis- 
comfort, lost  completely  in  the  great  thoughts  which  filled  his 
mind. 

He  manifested  occasionally,  but  in  an  entirely  subconscious 
manner,  a  sensation  of  chill,  because,  although  we  were  in  the 


9 

South,  in  front  of  Savannah,  there  was  a  chill  in  the  air  of 
the  December  night,  and  the  warmth  of  the  camp-fire  was 
agreeable. 

He  stood  in  the  warm  ashes,  at  times  unconsciously  brush- 
ing the  ashes  over  one  foot  with  the  other,  and  he  drew  as 
close  to  the  camp-fire  as  his  subconsciousness  deemed  to  be 
prudent,  but  with  the  exception  of  this  automatic  and  purely 
physical  impulse  he  was  lost  to  every  surrounding. 

He  was  deep  in  thought. 

Then  I  knew  nothing  of  what  he  was  thinking,  as  I  sat  and 
watched  him,  scarcely  daring  to  move  lest  I  should  disturb 
his  revery  by  obtruding  myself  upon  his  consciousness. 

Finally  he  turned  and  went  into  the  tent  to  resume  his  con- 
versation with  Colonel  Babcock. 

And  so  the  picture  of  the  great  soldier,  which  was  indelibly 
stamped  upon  my  memory,  dissolved,  and  I  found  myself 
sitting  alone  before  the  camp-fire. 

Fortunately  we  now  know  the  thoughts  that  were  in  General 
Sherman's  mind  on  the  night  of  December  15,  1864,  in  front 
of  Savannah.  We  have  the  record  in  General  Grant's  dis- 
patches and  in  General  Sherman's  letters  and  memoirs. 

Under  date  of  Headquarters,  Armies  of  the  United  States, 
City  Point,  Va.,  December  3,  1864,  written  before  we  had 
reached  the  seacoast,  General  Grant  wrote  to  General  Sher- 
man :  "In  this  letter  I  do  not  intend  to  give  you  anything  like 
directions  for  future  action,  but  will  state  a  general  idea  I 
have,  and  will  get  your  views  after  you  have  established  your- 
self on  the  seacoast.  With  your  veteran  army  I  hope  to  get 
control  of  the  only  two  through  routes  from  East  to  West 
possessed  by  the  enemy  before  the  fall  of  Atlanta.  The  con- 
dition will  be  filled  by  holding  Savannah  and  Branchville.  If 
Wilmington  falls,  a  force  from  there  can  cooperate  with  you." 


10 

"After  all  becomes  quiet,  and  roads  become  so  bad  up  here 
that  there  is  likely  to  be  a  week  or  two  when  nothing  can 
be  done,  I  will  run  down  the  coast  to  see  you.  If  you  desire 
it,  I  will  ask  Mrs.  Sherman  to  go  with  me." 

Under  date  of  Headquarters,  Armies  of  the  United  States, 
City  Point,  Va.,  December  6,  1864  (three  days  later),  General 
Grant  wrote  to  General  Sherman: 

"On  reflection,  since  sending  my  letter  by  the  hands  of 
Lieutenant  Dunn,  I  have  concluded  that  the  most  important 
operation  towards  closing  out  the  rebellion  will  be  to  close  out 
Lee  and  his  army. 

"You  have  now  destroyed  the  roads  of  the  South  so  that 
it  will  probably  take  them  three  months  without  interruption 
to  reestablish  a  through  line  from  East  to  West.  In  that 
time  I  think  the  job  here  will  be  effectually  completed. 

"My  idea  now  is  that  you  establish  a  base  on  the  seacoast, 
fortify  and  leave  in  it  all  your  artillery  and  cavalry,  and 
enough  infantry  to  protect  them,  and  at  the  same  time  so 
threaten  the  interior  that  the  militia  of  the  South  will  have 
to  be  kept  at  home.  With  the  balance  of  your  command  come 
here  by  water  with  all  dispatch.  Select  yourself  the  officer  to 
leave  in  command,  but  you  I  want  in  person.  Unless  you  see 
objections  to  this  plan  which  I  cannot  see,  use  every  vessel 
going  to  you  for  purposes  of  transportation.     *     *     * 

"*  *  *  Colonel  Babcock  (the  bearer  of  this  letter)  will 
give  you  full  information  of  all  operations  now  in  progress." 

This  was  the  dispatch  which  Colonel  Babcock  placed  in 
General  Sherman's  hands  the  night  of  December  15,  1864. 

It  was  of  this  plan  to  establish  a  fortified  base  on  the  coast 
in  which  to  leave  his  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  with  the 
infantry  of  his  army  to  join  General  Grant,  by  sea,  in  front 
of  Petersburg,  that  General  Sherman  was  so  intently  thinking. 


11 

I  am  convinced  that  it  was  then  as  he  stood  in  the  warm 
ashes  of  our  camp-fire,  that  the  alternative  plan  of  the  South 
Carolina  campaign  crystallized  itself  in  General  Sherman's 
mind.  The  order  to  join  General  Grant  in  front  of  Peters- 
burg with  the  infantry  of  his  army  acted  as  a  mordant  in 
fixing  the  color  of  his  thought.  Up  to  the  moment  of  the 
reception  of  this  order  at  the  hands  of  Colonel  Babcock,  I 
can  find  no  indication  in  the  correspondence  of  Generals  Grant 
and  Sherman  of  a  plan  of  campaign  for  the  army  after  the 
capture  of  Savannah,  beyond  the  very  general  idea  that  we 
were  still  to  move  "to  the  front,"  and  seek  the  enemy.  The 
first  clearly  defined  outline  of  the  campaign  through  the 
Carolinas  which  I  have  been  able  to  discover,  occurs  in  Gen- 
eral Sherman's  letter  to  General  Grant  dated  December  16, 
1864,  written  the  day  after  he  received  the  order  to  join  him 
with  the  infantry  of  his  army. 

General  Sherman  was  gifted  with  a  warm  imagination,  and 
a  virile  and  active  mind.  He  saw  clearly  and  distinctly,  and 
his  mind  acted  with  marvelous  rapidity.  He  was  of  a  nervous 
temperament,  always  on  the  move:  always  full  of  thought: 
fertile  in  resources  of  thought:  calling  on  his  imagination  for 
the  answer  to  any  problem  of  the  moment:  and  always  ready 
with  a  plan  of  action. 

In  his  Memoirs,  writing  of  the  period  of  the  opening  of 
the  campaign  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea,  General  Sherman  says : 

"I  had  no  purpose  to  march  direct  for  Richmond  by  way 
of  Augusta  and  Charlotte,  but  always  designed  to  reach  the 
seacoast  first  at  Savannah  or  Port  Royal,  South  Carolina, 
and  even  kept  in  mind  the  alternative  of  Pensacola." 

The  letters  from  General  Grant  of  December  3d  and  6th, 
1864,  from  which  I  have  quoted,  demonstrate  that  no  idea  of 


12 

the   South   Carolina   campaign   had   been   discussed   between 
General  Sherman  and  himself. 

General  Grant  had  undoubtedly  his  own  ideas  of  the  duty 
which  Sherman's  army  should  be  called  upon  to  perform, 
but  knowing  nothing  of  General  Sherman's  plans  beyond  the 
capture  of  Savannah,  he  concluded  his  letter  of  December 
6th,  1864,  as  follows : 

"Unless  you  see  objections  to  this  plan  (to  join  General 
Grant  with  the  infantry  of  the  army)  which  I  cannot  see, 
use  every  vessel  going  to  you  for  purposes  of  transportation." 
During  the  march  to  the  sea  the  horizon  of  thought  broad- 
ened before  Sherman.  He  foresaw  the  arrival  of  his  army 
on  the  seacoast,  and  realized  that  the  capture  of  Savannah  was 
a  mere  incident,  not  the  real  object  of  his  campaign.  He 
abandoned  the  thought  of  Pensacola  as  a  possible  point  on  the 
seacoast  at  which  he  should  establish  communication  with  the 
fleet  so  soon  as  it  became  apparent  that  General  Lee  would 
not  detach  from  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  to  meet  him 
in  Georgia. 

I  beileve  that  General  Sherman's  mind  was  full  of  various 
plans  of  campaign,  but  that  nothing  definite  had  been  deter- 
mined even  in  his  own  mind  beyond  the  capture  of  Savannah, 
until  he  received  General  Grant's  order  of  December  6th, 
1864,  directing  the  embarkation  of  the  infantry  of  his  army 
and  its  transportation  to  Petersburg,  Virginia,  when  a  crisis 
of  thought  occurred. 

Ready  to  obey  General  Grant's  order,  the  thought,  never- 
theless, became  instantly  a  fixed  thought  in  his  mind  that  the 
better  plan  would  be  to  march  through  the  Carolinas,  via 
Columbia  and  Raleigh,  facing  meanwhile  the  contingency  of 
a  heavy  concentration  of  the  enemy  in  his  front. 

Well  has  Sherman  said  that  he  regards  the  South  Carolina 


13 

campaign  as  his  finest  campaign.  Strategetically  it  was  not 
only  his  finest  campaign,  but  one  of  the  finest  of  the  war. 

Consider  for  a  moment  the  character  and  the  problems  of 
that  campaign. 

December  15,  1864,  had  just  witnessed  through  the  capture 
of  Fort  McAllister  the  establishment  of  communication  with 
our  fleet,  and  the  establishment  of  a  base  of  supplies  on  the 
lower  Ogeechee,  but  Savannah  had  not  then  fallen. 

It  contemplated  the  fall  of  Savannah,  a  city  easily  defended, 
however,  because  it  could  be  approached  only  over  a  few 
established  roads  leading  into  the  city  across  the  marshes, 
the  balance  of  its  periphery  being  rice  fields  under  water 
and  swamps,  except  toward  the  Savannah  River,  where  there 
was  a  moderate  front  of  dry  land  upon  which  regular  ap- 
proaches could  be  established,  but  equally  a  narrow  front  for 
defense. 

Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  the  enemy  held  interior  lines 
of  operations  from  Richmond  to  our  front,  along  railways  in 
working  condition,  and  that,  as  General  Sherman  should 
advance  into  South  Carolina  northward,  pushing  the  enemy 
before  him,  his  heads  of  columns  constantly  under  fire,  he 
would  be  drawing  nearer  by  every  mile  of  his  progress  to 
that  point  at  which,  under  every  principle  of  the  art  of  war, 
he  might  anticipate  finding  General  Lee  with  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  or  with  a  very  considerable  part  of  that 
army  in  reinforcement  of  the  enemy  whom  he  had  been  steadily 
pushing  northward,  ready  for  battle. 

Of  course  this  supposes  that  General  Lee  could  have  with- 
drawn from  Richmond  and  Petersburg  the  whole  or  a  very 
considerable  part  of  his  army,  either  without  attracting  Gen- 
eral Grant's  attention  to  such  movement,  or  so  have  with- 
drawn as  to  have  got  the  start  of   General   Grant  in   any 


14 

movement  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  might  have  attempted 
to  make  to  interfere  through  battle  with  the  withdrawal  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  As  General  Lee  had,  in 
the  winter  of  1864-1865,  command  of  the  railroads  leading 
southwest  from  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  and  could  have 
undoubtedly  withdrawn  his  army  had  he  cared  to  do  so, 
this  possibility  of  finding  himself  confronted  by  General  Lee 
somewhere  in  the  Carolinas  General  Sherman  had  to  consider 
as  a  material  part  of  his  problem. 

On  the  one  hand  was  the  order  to  prepare  to  join  General 
Grant  by  water  with  the  infantry  of  his  army,  on  the  other 
the  preservation  of  his  army  intact  for  a  long  and  uncertain 
campaign  through  the  Carolinas,  with  the  contingency  which 
he  had  reason  to  believe  was  an  almost  military  certainty, 
that  before  reaching  a  new  base  on  the  more  northern  Atlantic 
coast  he  might  be  forced  to  face  General  Lee  and  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  reinforced  by  the  troops  already  in  his 
front,  in  battle. 

That  he  contemplated  such  a  campaign,  that  he  deliberately 
chose  the  more  difficult  and  uncertain  campaign,  instead  of 
falling  in  at  once  with  General  Grant's  plan  to  join  him  in 
front  of  Petersburg  with  the  infantry  of  the  army,  stamps 
General  Sherman  as  a  great  soldier — certainly  as  one  of  the 
finest  strategists  of  the  war. 

That  General  Lee  did  not  concentrate  in  General  Sherman's 
front  in  the  Carolinas  does  not  detract  in  the  least  from  the 
consideration  in  which  General  Sherman's  fame  as  a  soldier 
should  be  held. 

It  was  manifestly  General  Lee's  move ;  the  only  move  which 
offered  the  possibility  of  success  to  the  cause  of  the  South 
at  that  stage  of  the  war.  That  General  Lee  did  not  avail 
himself  of  it,  or  at  least  did  not  make  the  attempt  to  avail 


15 

himself  of  it,  is  unaccountable  as  we  study  the  situation  fifty 
years  after,  having  regard  to  his  reputation  as  a  soldier  of 
genius  and  daring. 

What  would  have  been  the  result  of  General  Sherman's 
campaign  in  the  Carolinas  had  General  Lee  concentrated  in 
his  front  it  is  unnecessary  to  consider.  He  did  not  do  so,  and 
the  South  Carolina  campaign  has  passed  into  history  as  one 
of  the  great  strategic  campaigns  of  the  war.  And  that  it 
was  largely  contributive  to  the  successful  conclusion  of  the 
war  is  also  a  concession  of  history. 

That  General  Sherman's  mind  was  full  of  these  great 
thoughts  on  the  evening  of  December  15,  1864,  is  proven  by 
his  letter  of  December  16,  1864  (the  next  day's  date),  to 
General  Grant,  in  which  he  acknowledges  the  receipt  of  his 
letter  of  December  6,  1864,  and  while  undertaking  to  join 
him  in  front  of  Petersburg  with  from  50,000  to  60,000 
infantry,  outlines  the  thought  in  his  mind  which  crystallized 
in  the  South  Carolina  campaign. 

General  Sherman  says :  "My  four  corps  full  of  experience 
and  full  of  ardor,  coming  to  you  en  masse,  equal  to  60,000 
fighting  men,  will  be  a  reinforcement  that  Lee  cannot  disre- 
gard. Indeed  with  my  present  command,  I  had  expected, 
after  reducing  Savannah,  instantly  to  march  to  Columbia, 
South  Carolina:  thence  to  Raleigh,  and  thence  to  report  to 
you.  But  this  would  consume,  it  may  be,  six  weeks'  time 
after  the  fall  of  Savannah,  whereas  by  sea  I  can  probably 
reach  you  with  my  men  and  arms  before  the  middle  of 
January." 

But  with  General  Grant's  order  of  December  6,  1864,  before 
him,  General  Sherman  made  every  preparation  to  join  Gen- 
eral Grant  by  sea  in  front  of  Petersburg,  directing  the  cor- 
duroying roads,  building  docks  and  arranging  for  the  con- 


16 

centration  of  his  artillery  and  transportation  in  a  fortified 
camp  near  Fort  McAllister,  which  was  being  studied  under 
the  direction  of  the  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Army,  Colonel  Poe, 
meanwhile  prosecuting  the  siege  operations  against  Savannah. 

The  city,  however,  was  evacuated  by  General  Hardee  on  the 
night  of  December  20,  1864,  and  was  entered  by  our  troops 
on  the  morning  of  December  21,  1864. 

Under  date  Headquarters,  Armies  of  the  United  States, 
December  18,  1864,  before  he  had  received  General  Sherman's 
letter  of  December  16,  1864,  General  Grant  wrote  to  General 
Sherman  from  Washington : 

"I  did  think  the  best  thing  to  do  was  to  bring  the  greater 
part  of  your  army  here  and  wipe  out  Lee.  The  turn  affairs 
now  seem  to  be  taking  (General  Thomas'  victory  at  Nashville, 
Tennessee,  December  15  and  16,  1864,  and  the  destruction 
of  General  Hood's  army),  has  shaken  me  in  that  opinion.  I 
doubt  whether  you  may  not  accomplish  more  toward  that 
result  where  you  are  than  if  brought  here,  especially  as  I  am 
informed  since  my  arrival  in  the  city,  that  it  would  take  two 
months  to  get  you  here  with  all  the  other  calls  there  are  for 
ocean  transportation. 

"I  want  to  get  your  views  about  what  ought  to  be  done 
and  what  can  be  done.  If  you  capture  the  garrison  of  Savan- 
nah, it  certainly  will  compel  Lee  to  detach  from  Richmond, 
or  give  us  nearly  the  whole  South.  My  own  opinion  is  that 
Lee  is  averse  to  going  out  of  Virginia,  and  if  the  cause  of 
the  South  is  lost  he  wants  Richmond  to  be  the  last  place 
surrendered.  If  he  has  such  views,  it  may  be  well  to  indulge 
him  until  we  get  everything  else  in  our  hands." 

Here  we  have  on  the  18th  of  December,  1864,  and  before  he 
had  received  General  Sherman's  letter  of  December  16th,  a 
revocation  by  General  Grant  of  his  order  of  December  6th 


17 

to  General  Sherman  to  join  him  in  front  of  Petersburg  with 
the  infantry  of  his  army;  and  an  invitation  to  General  Sher- 
man to  submit  his  views  as  to  the  next  move  to  be  undertaken 
by  his  army. 

Under  date  of  December  24,  1864,  General  Sherman  ac- 
knowledges the  receipt  of  General  Grant's  dispatch  of  Decem- 
ber 18,  1864,  and  says : 

"I  am  pleased  that  you  have  modified  your  former  orders." 
"I  feel  no  doubt  whatever  as  to  our  future  plans.  I  have 
thought  them  over  so  long  and  well  that  they  appear  as  clear 
as  daylight.  I  left  Augusta  untouched  on  purpose,  because 
the  enemy  will  be  in  doubt  as  to  my  objective  point,  after 
we  cross  the  Savannah  River,  whether  it  be  Augusta  or 
Charleston,  and  will  naturally  divide  his  force.  I  will  then 
move  either  on  B  ranch ville  or  Columbia  by  any  curved  line 
that  gives  us  the  best  supplies,  breaking  up  in  our  course  as 
much  railroad  as  possible :  then  ignoring  Charleston  and 
Augusta  both,  I  would  occupy  Columbia  and  Camden,  pausing 
there  long  enough  to  observe  the  effect.  I  would  then  strike 
for  the  Charleston  and  Wilmington  Railroad  somewhere  be- 
tween the  Santee  and  Cape  Fear  River,  and,  if  possible,  com- 
municate with  the  fleet  under  Admiral  Dahlgren.  *  *  * 
Charleston  is  now  a  mere  desolated  wreck,  and  is  hardly  worth 
the  time  it  would  take  to  starve  it  out.  *  *  *  But  on  the 
hypothesis  of  ignoring  Charleston  and  taking  Wilmington,  I 
would  then  favor  a  movement  direct  on  Raleigh.  The  game 
is  then  up  with  Lee  unless  he  comes  out  of  Richmond,  avoids 
you  and  fights  me,  in  which  case  I  should  reckon  on  your 
being  on  his  heels.  I  feel  confident  that  I  can  break  up  the 
whole  railroad  system  of  South  Carolina  and  North  Carolina, 
and  be  on  the  Roanoke  either  at  Raleigh  or  Weldon  by  the 
time  spring  fairly  opens,  and  if  you  feel  confident  that  you 


18 

can  whip  Lee  outside  his  intrenchments,  I  feel  equally  confi- 
dent that  I  can  handle  him  in  the  open  country." 

I  think  the  glimpse  of  Sherman  on  the  night  of  December 
15,  1864,  as  he  stood  in  the  ashes  of  the  camp-fire  at  the 
Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  just  after  re- 
ceiving General  Grant's  order  of  December  6,  1864,  to  join 
him  by  sea  in  front  of  Petersburg  with  the  infantry  of  the 
army,  is  worth  preserving,  as  I  believe  that  that  order  crys- 
tallized in  Sherman's  mind  the  idea  of  the  South  Carolina 
campaign,  making  it  the  dominant  idea  of  his  thoughts :  a 
campaign,  which  for  its  strategy,  ranks  high  in  military  history. 

Maxwell  Van  Zandt  Woodhull. 


M 


UNIVERSITY  OF  N.C.  AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


00032742355 


FOR  USE  ONLY  IN 
THE  NORTH  CAROLINA  COLLECTION 


■  -'--■/■  ■lv.;:'"'.  ■  ';•■_■  ■■;:;-  ■:,■:  ;■■■ ',,...:  ':  •".'-.  -••."'■.'/':.■ , ,.  ■  ■;■.  •?:•■  ■.  •".■;....  ''':-;■ ; 


